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Article 8

NOTES
Problems of Arrest Without Warrant in Nebraska
The basic authority of a police officer to arrest in Nebraska without a warrant as set forth by statute is confined to those situations in
which the arrestee is found committing a crime.' In addition, private
persons are by statute authorized to arrest if a felony or petit larceny
reasonable grounds for
has in fact been committed and there exist
2
believing that the person arrested is guilty.
However, an examination of past decisions concerning the authority
of an officer to arrest for a crime not committed within his presence,
and for which he has no warrant, points out the uncertainty in the
existing law.
The early cases of Simmerman v. State3 and Nelson v. State4 held
that an officer without a warrant acted as an individual without police
authority unless he witnessed the criminal act. The requirements were
set forth that the officer must have notice that a felony or a petit
larceny has been committed, and there must be reasonable ground for
believing that the person to be arrested is guilty. Otherwise, the arrest
is illegal.
The requirement that a felony or petit larceny must in fact have
occurred for the arrest to be justified was seemingly removed by the
decision of Diers v. Mallon,5 the court making a distinction between
the powers of police and those of private persons. It was held that
an arrest based upon reasonable belief that a felony had been committed, even though there had been no felony, was not illegal when
made by a peace officer. As authority for this point, the court relied
upon the Simmerman case, seemingly mistaking the ruling of that
case. The Diers case gave police officers greater power than that conferred by any of the statutes involved,' but the holding's basic premise
of a distinction between the powers of an officer and those of private
persons was upheld by the decision of Kyner v. Laubner7 shortly thereafter.
1

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-401 (Reissue 1948): "Every sheriff, deputy sheriff,
constable, marshal or deputy marshal, watchman or police officer shall arrest
and detain any person found violating any law of this state, or any legal
ordinance of any city or incorporated village, until a legal warrant can be
obtained." (emphasis added). See Fry v. Kaessner, 48 Neb. 233, 66 N.W. 1126
(1896).

' Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-402 (Reissue 1948): "Any person not an officer may,
without warrant, arrest any person, if a petit larceny or a felony has been committed, and there is reasonable ground to believe the person arrested guilty
of such offense, and may detain him until a legal warrant can be obtained."
* 16 Neb. 615, 21 N.W. 387 (1884).
*33 Neb. 528, 50 N.W. 679 (1891).
46 Neb. 121, 64 N.W. 722 (1895).

See notes 1 and 2 supra.
3 Neb. (Unof.) 370, 91 N.W. 491 (1902).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The only subsequent decision concerning this problem was in Halsey v. Phillips8 where the court, without citing any of the four previous
decisions on the question, stated:
When an arrest without a warrant is sought to be justified, it must appear that a crime has been committeed, and there must be reasonable
grounds to believe that the persoh arrested is guilty of the offense.
Since the language was applied to the authority of a police officer, it
seemingly reinstated the test of an actual felony or petit larceny having been committed as prerequisite to the arrest. However, it certainly does not expressly overrule any of the prior decisions, and thus
adds to the confusion.
Although there has been no litigation directly concerning this issue
since the Halsey case, it is evident that the rule of the Diers case is
regarded as authority in Nebraska.0 The idea that a police officer has
"inherent" or "common law" power apart from statute is widely accepted, 10 but there is considerable doubt as to the soundness of this
position. The modern police force did not exist at common law, having
originated in England in 1829, and the common law watchman bears
little similarity to the modern police officer.'1 The status of all present
police officers in Nebraska is created by statute, 12 and they are generally considered to be "public officers."'13 It is generally conceded that
most public officers may exercise only such authority as is granted
by statute,' 4 and police officers have been included within this classification. 1 In Nebraska, it has been held that the acts of a public officer
which are beyond the express authorization of statute are void, 6 and
that custom or usuage will not be allowed to enlarge or extend powers
defined by statute.'7 Although the question has never been before the
courts in Nebraska, it is evident that the reasoning of the Diers and
Kyner cases is not immune to attack, especially since other Nebraska
decisions are not in accord with the position they support.
8

104 Neb. 648, 178 N.W. 218 (1920).

12 Fisher, Courts of Limited Jurisdiction § 489, p. 921 (1950); A.L.I. Code
of Criminal Procedure 236 (1931). The conflict of Nebraska decisions is pointed
out in 6 C.J.S., Arrest § 6, p. 588 (1937).
See cases collected in authorities cited supra note 9.
For a detailed history of the law of arrest and police officers see Hall,
Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 566 (1936).
'Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 14-601 et seq., 15-306, 16-308, 17-107 (1943); §§ 60-432,
60-401, 84-106 (Reissue 1950).
11 See cases collected in Note, 84 A.L.R. 309 (1933); Note, 156 A.L.R. 1936
(1945).
"' See cases collected in Note, 65 A.L.R. 811 (1930).
" James v. Atlantic & E. Carolina R.R., 233 N.C. 581 65 S.E.2d 214 (1951).
18
Witzenburg v. State, 140 Neb. 171, 299 N.W. 533 (1941).
Shambaugh v. City Bank of Elm Creek, 118 Neb. 817, 226 N.W. 460 (1929).
A problem may also arise concerning the effect of a statute which confers
"common law" powers upon an officer, when the actual extent or existence of
such powers is in doubt. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2217 (Reissue 1948).

NOTES

Even accepting the decision of the Diers case as the existing rule
in Nebraska, it is apparent that a tremendous gap exists between police
practices and statutory authority.' 8 Officers in Nebraska have authority to arrest without warrant in special situations expressly covered by
particular statutes, 19 but such statutes represent a patchwork attempt
at protection, and officers still have no power to arrest for most misdemeanors unless the crime is committed in their presence, or unless
they possess a warrant.20 Even if a warrant has been issued for the
arrest of a misdeameanant, it is impossible for all officers concerned to
have actual possession of the warrant, and the authorized arrest may
be considered illegal. 21
The existence of this questionable state of the law has many implications since the legality of the arrest may become an issue in almost
any proceeding involving the arrested party.
An outstanding example of this problem in Nebraska arises in connection with the privelege to resist an illegal arrest. Although it is the
duty of a person being lawfully arrested to submit to the authority of
the arresting officer, 22 he may go so far as to kill the officer if necessary
to prevent an illegal arrest, and the killing will not amount even to
manslaughter. 23 A technicality such as this might allow a criminal
to escape punishment for a murder committed while the criminal was
being unlawfully arrested, even though the officer acted in good faith.
Such a situation is hardly consistent with the best interests of any
society attempting to promote law enforcement.

11 For example, see Warner, Investigating the Law of Arrest, 28 A.B.A.J.

151 (1940).
"1Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-220 (1943) (in certain cases of gambling); § 28-565
(Reissue 1948) (person charged with cruelty to animals); § 28-1118 (Reissue

1948) (tramps); § 23-1811 (1943) (upon order of coroner); § 32-466 (Reissue
1952) (persons disturbing elections); § 28-805 (Reissue 1948) (rioters); § 281238 (Reissue 1948) (persons stealing rides on trains); § 29-413 (Reissue 1948)
(on verbal order of magistrate). Many of these and similar provisions are
unnecessary since the situations involved are covered by the provisions of
§§ 29-401, 29-402 (Reissue 1948).
20 Halsey v. Phillips, 104 Neb. 648, 178 N.W. 218 (1920).
21 Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 124 S.E. 242 (1924); McCullough v.
Greenfiled, 133 Mich. 463, 95 N.W. 532 (1903); People v. McLean, 48 Mich.
480, 36 N.W. 231 (188). This problem has been remedied by statute in Louisiana; See La. Rev. Stat. § 15:69 (1951).
12Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-729 (Reissue 1948).
2 Simmerman v. State, 14 Neb. 568, 17 N.W. 115 (1883), appeal from second
trial, 16 Neb. 615, 21 N.W. 387 (1884). Although resistance may be offered
against an illegal arrest, no cases go so far as to allow the resisting party to
lawfully kill the officer; see Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900);
State v. Rousseau, 40 Wash.2d 92, 241 P.2d 447 (1952); Davis v. State, 53 Okla.
Crim. Rep. 411, 12 P.2d 555 (1932); Howell v. State, 163 Ga. 14, 134 S.E. 59

(1926); State v. Gum, 68 W.Va. 105, 69 S.E. 463 (1910); Roberson v. State,
43 Fla. 156, 29 So. 535 (1901); State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, 25 N.W. 793

(1885).
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A problem also exists where a person who is actually guilty of a
crime is arrested without a warrant, but there are no reasonable
grounds for the arresting officer to believe that the person is guilty of
the crime. The state might profit by the us of evidence obtained in the
and the evidence obtained does
arrest, 24 but such an arrest is unlawful
25
not justify the action of the officer.
Witnesses to a crime or accident cannot be compelled to tell an
officer even their name, and the only means by which this information
might be obtained would be for the officer to arrest the prospective
witness. 20 Any person taken into custody without a warrant and then
released without having been brought before a magistrate has been
falsely arrested, because an arrest, by definition, is the taking into
custody of a person so that he may be brought before a magistrate to
answer for an alleged crime, 27 and legal power to release is in most
cases in the magistrate alone.28 The procedure involved may be important in cases involving major offenses, but it is certainly not
to a crime, or
necessary if the party arrested is an innocent bystander
29
perhaps a drunk receiving a free nights lodging.
Numerous complications may arise in cases involving search of a
party who has not been first arrested.30 An excellent example of police
practice of doubtful legality is the "frisking" of suspicious characters
who have not been placed under arrest by an officer, 31 and justification
for such action cannot be made by an officer on the grounds that the
search was made in the interest of self-preservation, or that the officer
was only following instructions.32
These are illustrations of only a few complications among the many
which exist due to the fact that the present law of arrest was formulated prior to the advent of modern police practices and organized
crime. The consequences of illegal arrest are placed upon police officers
themselves more than anyone else, for if guilty of any illegal action,
" Billings v. State, 109 Neb. 596, 191 N.W. 721 (1923).
-Grau v. Forge, 183 Ky. 521, 209 S.W. 369 (1919); Scoopmire v. Talflinger,
114 Ind. App. 419, 52 N.E.2d 728 (1944). It is generally assumed that good
intentions constitute no defense or justification for an illegal act; see Note,
92 A.L.R. 481 (1934); Note, 20 A.L.R. 639 (1922).
" For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Warner, The Uniform
Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 342 (1942).
" Restatment, Torts § 112 (1934); Black, Law Dictionary 140 (4th ed. 1951).
- Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-410 (Reissue 1948).
"For examples and some ramifications of this problem, see Warner, The
Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 336 (1942).
"oSee cases collected in Note, 82 A.L.R. 784 (1933); Note, 74 A.L.R. 1387
(1931); Note,51 A.L.R.424 (1927); Note,32 A.L.R. 68 (124).
11It isgenerally held that a search without warrant may be made only
as an incident of a lawful arrest, but there seem to be no cases directly concerning the problem of whether "frisking" constitutes an arrest or actual

search. However, see Gisske v.Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 Pac. 43 (1908), on
the general problem of questioning and searching suspicious persons.
" Supra note 24.
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they are subject to criminal actions such as false imprisonment, "3
assault and battery, 4 or kidnapping.3 5 In addition, they are liable in
tort for their acts,3 6 and many officers under bond3 7 may force their
surety into the litigation.38 Such liability is necessary in cases of
malicious police practice, but it places a heavy burden upon well-meaning officers who innocently or mistakenly carry out their instructions.
The net result of past decisions and existing statutes is to place
officers in a position of uncertainty as to their powers and duties, and
leave them legally powerless to effect the efficient law enforcement
demanded by the public. By taking an oath to uphold the law, they
may be bound in some instances to allow those guilty of crime to
escape, since they are prevented by the law they enforce from arresting the criminal. Such an anomalous result injures society as a
whole and may breed contempt for "inefficent" police operations.
The entire uncertainty and inadequacy of the law points out the
necessity for the formulation of a more concise statutory authority
upon this subject which will bring the law into accord with modern
conditions. 39 It is clearly not advisable to grant all officers a blank
warrant or summons with which to carry out their duties, and the
requirement for reasonable grounds for an arrest should always be
maintained, but some attempt should be made, within constitutional
limits, 40 to grant needed authority to police officers so that they may
at least legally keep pace with the problems which confront them in
their operations.
JoHN S. SCHAPER, '56

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416 (Reissue 1948).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-411 (Reissue 1948).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-417 (Reissue 1948). For an example of criminal
proceedings against a police officer, see Macomber v. State, 137 Neb. 882,
24

291 N.W.674 (1940).
11 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-304 (Reissue 1948).
" TNeb. Rev. Stat. § 14-606 (1943) (police of metropolitan cities); §§ 15-251,

15-308 (1943) (police of primary cities); § 84-106 (Reissue 1950) (state
sheriff); § 60-432 (Reissue 1952) (state patrol); § 11-119 (1943) (sheriffs and
constables).
'8 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 11-112 (1943). For example, see Bassinger v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty, 58 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1932).

' For examples of proposed statutes, see A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure
21 et seq. (1931); The Uniform Arrest Act, set out and discussed in Warner,
The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315 (1942).
" There are numerous problems related to the law of arrest which involve
due process of law under U. S. Const. Amend XIV, § 1 and Neb. Const. Art. I,
§ 3. The constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure is
also of importance; see U. S. Const. Amend. IV and Neb. Const. Art. I, § 7.
For an example of the constitutional problems which may be involved in arrests without warrant, see Note, 1 A.L.R. 586 (1918).

